If Books Could Kill - February 09, 2023


The End of History

Topics
The Lab Leak [TEASER] The Clash of Civilizations

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Length

47 minutes

Words per minute

168.85

Word count

7,968

Sentence count

422

Harmful content

Misogyny

1

sentences flagged

Toxicity

58

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Hate speech

25

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Transcript

Transcript generated with Whisper (turbo).
Misogyny classifications generated with MilaNLProc/bert-base-uncased-ear-misogyny .
Toxicity classifications generated with s-nlp/roberta_toxicity_classifier .
Hate speech classifications generated with facebook/roberta-hate-speech-dynabench-r4-target .
Topics generated with Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct.
00:00:00.000 Michael. Peter. So what do you know about the end of history?
00:00:04.200 I mostly know that 80% of the arguments about it were about the title, not the actual book.
00:00:09.280 so before we talk about the essay and the book we should probably talk about francis fukuyama
00:00:32.700 He's a political philosopher who starts to work at the Rand Corporation in 1979.
00:00:40.440 Fukuyama is also doing, he works for the Reagan administration and the State Department,
00:00:45.160 the Bush administration, the Bush-Wahn administration.
00:00:47.580 And in the summer of 1989, he publishes a little essay called The End of History?
00:00:56.020 Oh, summer of 89?
00:00:58.500 So before the wall came down.
00:00:59.600 It is before the wall came down. Our wall comes down, I think, towards the end of the year,
00:01:04.280 right? November. And the Soviet Union is teetering, but still won't formally dissolve
00:01:09.900 for a couple of years. There's an understanding that at this point, the Cold War is ending.
00:01:16.160 There's this lingering question in everyone's mind of what comes next, what comes next for
00:01:21.820 all of us, what comes next for America. And the end of history is Fukuyama's attempt to answer
00:01:27.700 that question and his answer really like captures the imagination of political elites especially
00:01:34.380 and really defines how american politicians western politicians and academics look at the world yeah
00:01:42.320 for the next like quarter century you could not get away from this book yeah i was in college in
00:01:47.680 the mid-aughts and it was assigned oh yeah by more than one professor i read this book twice
00:01:52.680 once in grad school and once in other grad school and i barely remember it yeah i think
00:02:02.120 a lot of that comes from like his writing style yeah i mean look fukuyama is he's a smart guy
00:02:09.100 but he revels in the safety of abstraction right and i'm not an opponent of political philosophy 0.60
00:02:15.080 i enjoy it but there is a type of dumb person that thrives in the realm of political philosophy 0.70
00:02:21.980 because philosophical analysis provides so much abstraction that you can readily hide the fact 0.84
00:02:27.880 that you are not able to accurately describe the world.
00:02:31.460 Also, Peter, I don't know if you know this, but I have a master's degree in political philosophy.
00:02:35.800 I did not know that. 0.96
00:02:37.300 And what you're saying about people not knowing what the fuck they're talking about is exactly 0.97
00:02:41.540 like my grad school experience. I remember just being like, what do you mean? What exactly do 0.95
00:02:48.360 you mean please and people not being able to articulate it i have a political science degree
00:02:53.040 so i'm kind of a stem guy the hard science and the soft science now the thesis is best summarized
00:03:00.400 by a quote from the original essay what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the cold war
00:03:06.140 but the end of history as such that is the end point of mankind's ideological evolution
00:03:12.400 and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.
00:03:19.500 We did it, gang.
00:03:20.440 We came up with the ideal way to run a country.
00:03:23.920 I know it's crazy, but I think we got this.
00:03:26.720 I think we actually got this human society thing forever.
00:03:31.220 So, yeah, you know, the initial essay is just 15 pages or so, published in a little conservative
00:03:37.580 journal called The National Interest.
00:03:39.220 the book comes a couple years later in 1992 and it's called the end of history and the last man
00:03:47.000 so no more question mark we're making statements now yeah he's he's getting cocky i have been
00:03:52.660 looking forward to this episode because i always thought of him as someone who i don't agree with
00:03:58.460 like i think that the central thesis of his book is wrong but i also think that it contains some
00:04:04.640 like genuine insights. And a lot of the discussion and criticism of his book did, in fact, seem like
00:04:11.520 it was coming from people who thought that he was saying that like stuff wasn't going to happen
00:04:16.400 anymore. See, Francis, something happened. Your book is wrong. It's like, that's not really what
00:04:25.020 he was saying. Yeah, no, I think that's right. A lot of the criticism I saw was a little bit
00:04:30.780 off base and mischaracterized his work the ways in which he was wrong were much more subtle put it
00:04:36.780 that way right he takes care to say i'm not talking about the end of things happening humanity has
00:04:43.520 sort of decided upon a structure of governance for itself what's behind this thesis is the idea
00:04:51.680 that originated at least in western philosophy with hegel who articulated this idea of the
00:04:58.340 dialectical view of history, which just means that history has a narrative arc. There's a
00:05:03.880 beginning, there's a middle, there's an end. And it ends when society meets mankind's most
00:05:09.620 fundamental needs and wants. So like Marx was a proponent of this dialectical view, right? His
00:05:15.440 belief was that the course of history is defined by class struggle. And the end point is a stateless
00:05:21.640 communist society. Fukuyama is proposing something conceptually similar with a different endpoint,
00:05:25.760 Right. Two world wars have been fought, the result of which he believes the defeat of fascism.
00:05:31.340 And now he's seeing the Soviet Union fall. So he is witnessing in his mind a point in history where Western liberal democracy is not only ascendant, but is the final stage of human governance.
00:05:44.860 Right. Alternatives have been vanquished in the battlefield of ideas. And I don't want to get too deep into his discussion of like human nature, but he believes that liberal democracy satisfies mankind's innate desire for recognition. And that's why it's fundamentally appealing to people. And that's why it has prevailed and why there is no next step.
00:06:07.680 I have a huge fetish for like theory of everything books. These books like the end of history because they're always wrong, always wrong in like such fundamental ways, just like as a methodology. Here's the one true narrative. They never hold up to specifics.
00:06:25.520 Yeah, I enjoy a narrative. I think it can be useful, but there's only so far you can zoom out. Right. And Fukuyama has zoomed out impossibly far. Yeah. That's like the problem with the type of abstraction he uses where you get this essay. It's a short essay makes this quick point. And then I look at I glance at the book and it's 400 something pages. And I was like, oh, he's going to like use data to support his essay.
00:06:54.200 no naive Peter that was deeply naive that was Peter three weeks ago a young boy with his whole
00:07:04.320 life in front of him no it was actually 400 pages of extrapolation on the essay yeah each of those
00:07:12.600 15 pages in the original essay yanked into like 50 yeah it just goes on and on and on the same idea
00:07:21.040 rephrased over and over again i remember this from his future books too that both of them i mean
00:07:27.960 they're big they're like bricks and both of them easily could have been a new yorker article right
00:07:33.300 he does a lot of like in this essay i will like setting the table stuff does he do that in end
00:07:38.180 of history too where like the first four pages of every chapter are him like describing what he's
00:07:43.020 about to do yes and then he describes the exact same thing again in like 20 pages and then he
00:07:48.000 does like, what I've just described is, and then you like describe the same thing in like another
00:07:53.200 four pages. When you're bullshitting this much, you have to remind people what you're talking
00:07:57.300 about. It's incredible. And then you look back on the chapter and you're like, wait, he only gave
00:08:00.600 me like one example of what he was actually talking about. Like there's no actual information
00:08:05.200 in these chapters. It's just like prose. Oh, so much prose, man. He's trying to write a book
00:08:11.640 about the entire structure of human society and why he believes liberal democracy both has
00:08:17.500 prevailed and will continue to prevail. When the thesis is that broad, it's hard to know where and
00:08:24.500 how to start critiquing it. But I think when you glance at the thesis, a couple of major threshold
00:08:31.300 questions pop up. Namely, you're saying liberal democracy is the final form of human government.
00:08:37.000 But how are you defining liberal democracy? How does he answer that? He defines it. He says,
00:08:42.620 the state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects
00:08:47.580 through a system of laws man's universal right to freedom and democratic insofar as it exists
00:08:52.540 only with the consent of the governed so right off the bat we're working with a definition that
00:08:57.560 is simultaneously vague and like clearly untrue at least around the margins right because he's
00:09:03.480 describing it in these like super idealized terms that like it recognizes our deepest desires and
00:09:09.300 everybody gets to participate or whatever. But then you look around at actual liberal democracies
00:09:15.380 and all of them are doing that to varying degrees, right? Like none of them are actually
00:09:20.020 reaching this like high-minded definition that he's set, even though he's trying to describe
00:09:25.240 the real world with this. He is incredibly credulous about like the extent to which
00:09:30.580 countries that claim they are liberal democracies are actually either liberal or democratic.
00:09:35.820 Right. I mean, and a good example is he will describe aspects of the United States as like inherent to the United States while writing off other very real aspects of the United States as like not inherent. He says the U.S. is fundamentally egalitarian.
00:09:53.180 sure in making that argument he acknowledges like disproportionate black poverty for example
00:09:58.660 but he says that that's not fundamental to the u.s it's just the legacy of slavery and racism
00:10:04.720 right but like why is egalitarianism fundamental to america while racism is not yeah the three 0.90
00:10:11.320 fifths compromise was in the fucking constitution but it's basically this thing that we saw when all 0.87
00:10:15.780 the abu grabe stuff came out where george w bush was like we do not torture right like yeah we 0.97
00:10:21.280 tortured a bunch of people and like yeah it was u.s government policy and everything but we're not
00:10:25.400 the kind of people who do that give me a break right it's the international policy equivalent
00:10:31.580 of your dog bites someone and you're like he's he never does that yes in the book he makes an
00:10:39.360 argument that there are more liberal democracies now than in 1790 he says that there were three
00:10:45.780 in 1790. France, Switzerland, and the United States. I get what he's going for here. But is
00:10:52.280 that right? Was the United States a liberal democracy in 1790? Does it make sense to call
00:10:58.120 a country where only white male landowners could vote? Yeah. And one out of every what, 0.67
00:11:03.560 seven or eight people was a slave? Is that a liberal democracy? I don't know. I don't really
00:11:08.960 think so. Well, okay. I remember very vividly this part of the book. And I actually, at least from my
00:11:14.920 now 15-year-old memories of the book. I actually thought that this was one of the better parts of
00:11:19.680 it and one of the more convincing cases. I think it's a much more deep insight when you look at
00:11:24.480 the post-World War II world. If you look at the 1960s and 1970s, most of Latin America was under
00:11:31.460 some form of dictatorship. Spain, Portugal, the entire USSR, a huge number of people who used to
00:11:40.760 be living under totalitarian regimes are at least nominally living under democratically
00:11:46.500 elected regimes.
00:11:47.440 And like, I know that that's like a that's a blurry distinction or whatever, but like
00:11:51.420 there is actually a pretty big difference between like living under Franco and like
00:11:55.900 living under like modern Spain. 0.96
00:11:58.260 Completely agree.
00:11:58.900 And I think that the good faith read of his argument is that like democratic values are
00:12:05.560 originating and spreading, right?
00:12:07.600 Not necessarily that all these countries are embracing them in full.
00:12:10.440 Right. But there's this problem that he starts to run into where if you make that argument about the early US, right, it is espousing democratic values. And while it's not really embracing them in full, it's taking steps towards that. Right. I get that.
00:12:27.800 But what he ends up doing is then sort of failing to ask the important questions about like the later stage democracies, right, about whether they are in fact furthering democratic and liberal values.
00:12:41.880 So to give an example, there are a couple of chapters where he describes what he calls the weakness of strong states, meaning like the decline of authoritarian governments across the globe, especially in the post-World War II era.
00:12:56.600 His basic claim is like authoritarian governments are losing their grip on power because the people yearn for liberal democracy.
00:13:04.160 He mentions the example of Latin America, which had a surge of democratic governance starting in the 1980s.
00:13:11.840 This is why debunking this book is so fucking annoying because, yes, that is true in a sense.
00:13:17.740 But he's also hiding the ball when he has this discussion because he starts in the 1980s. 0.85
00:13:22.660 And if you're asking yourself why the 1980s, probably because if you go back before that, a lot of the history of Latin American politics involves the United States orchestrating violent coups that like placed authoritarian regimes into power.
00:13:40.780 I'm going to send you a little excerpt.
00:13:45.780 He says,
00:13:47.060 The 1982 Falklands-Malvinas War precipitated the downfall of the military junta in Argentina
00:13:53.660 and the rise of the democratically elected Alphonson government.
00:13:57.460 The Argentine transition was quickly followed by others throughout Latin America,
00:14:01.240 with military regimes stepping down in Uruguay and Brazil in 1983 and 1984, respectively.
00:14:07.460 By the end of the decade, the dictatorships of Stroessner in Paraguay and Pinochet in Chile
00:14:11.900 had given way to popularly elected governments.
00:14:14.880 Look at that. Everything's coming up democracy.
00:14:18.520 So look, I know that you're not a historian and neither am I, but do you know what literally
00:14:24.900 every single one of those authoritarian regimes has in common? They were put into place or
00:14:31.400 materially supported by the United States. He specifically mentions the fall of Pinochet
00:14:37.100 in Chile as a win for liberal democracy. But Chile had a long democratic tradition
00:14:43.520 that was purposefully and violently interrupted by the United States, which Fukuyama considers
00:14:50.220 like an OG bastion of liberal democracy.
00:14:53.320 Right.
00:14:53.480 You know, if you wanted to look at the Pinochet regime and say, well, this is a good example
00:14:58.100 of how authoritarian governments struggle to hold on to power, that in and of itself
00:15:02.860 isn't particularly offensive to me.
00:15:04.920 Right.
00:15:05.040 What's offensive is when you basically give almost no examples of your thesis in your
00:15:11.960 450 page book. And when you do, you take a an incredibly complex story that involves a huge
00:15:20.360 amount of malfeasance by the United States and you just compress that down to like authoritarian
00:15:25.620 states lose power. Right. That might be a forgivable oversight if you're a college freshman
00:15:29.760 writing baby's first poli sci paper. But this dude worked in the State Department under Reagan
00:15:36.180 and bush yeah if you worked at the state department in the 1980s you would come to work
00:15:42.040 and there was like a big button on your desk that said genocide and you would just smack that button
00:15:47.400 over and over for eight hours punch the clock and go home he's doing reply alls on like should we 0.99
00:15:53.020 kill this guy emails he knows what's up it it takes a certain kind of rotten brain to be like 0.96
00:15:59.780 a literal state department employee pointing to latin america right as proof that like liberal 0.99
00:16:05.020 democracy sort of organically triumphs over any ideological opponents.
00:16:10.200 So I guess it's like you go into a neighborhood and you bulldoze a bunch of homes and you put up
00:16:14.820 tennis courts. And then like 10 years later, you're like, oh, my God, everybody's playing
00:16:18.360 tennis. These people love tennis. People love tennis these days. I guess tennis is just like
00:16:23.560 the best sport. Hard not to notice that people love tennis more than homes. I remember reading
00:16:28.580 something years ago about mass shootings. They looked at every single mass shooting in the United
00:16:34.360 States and they came up with, I think it was like five typologies of mass shooters. It was like the
00:16:39.820 family annihilator, the give me attention, something, something. There were these like
00:16:43.760 types of shooters. And I think that would be a more accurate way to talk about the ways that
00:16:50.600 during those couple of decades, countries went from authoritarian regimes to quote unquote,
00:16:55.440 liberal democracies, because that is a real shift in the world. But for him to basically say that
00:17:00.320 like there's one thing that happened seems like really silly because we're talking about like
00:17:06.400 Uganda and Chile and South Korea. Right. I don't think you have to necessarily take it down as
00:17:13.200 granularly as like every single country is individual and you can't pull any themes out
00:17:18.020 of it. But also saying that there's like one theme also seems like equally disingenuous.
00:17:23.220 And it's not. Yeah. It's not entirely that he is necessarily wrong about the ways in which
00:17:29.580 authoritarian governments struggle to hold on to power i do believe that authoritarian governments
00:17:34.040 struggle to hold on to power in various little ways right and that can manifest in um in the
00:17:39.660 collapse of those governments it can manifest in the tightening of the yoke right uh there's all 0.78
00:17:46.260 sorts of shit that can happen and this is sort of something you you saw all over the world at the 0.76
00:17:50.040 time right the united states was not pro-liberal democracy it was anti-communist right anti-socialist 0.98
00:17:58.020 And so to the extent that democratic countries were producing left wing governments, the
00:18:03.680 United States was stepping in and trying to interfere.
00:18:06.800 Right.
00:18:07.080 And that's something that just does not get addressed in the end of history. 0.97
00:18:10.380 And it drives me fucking insane.
00:18:11.920 We need a segment on the show every time we cover an international affairs book just called 0.97
00:18:15.280 It's Kissinger.
00:18:18.400 Actually.
00:18:19.260 Yeah.
00:18:19.640 His like his head spinning into into frame.
00:18:23.560 Oh, God.
00:18:24.500 I really just got so angry. 0.99
00:18:25.800 fuck this guy i have like adrenaline um okay i got i really lost my ability to articulate stuff 0.99
00:18:33.180 and i was just like fuck we need to do one of those health help books after this one of those 0.99
00:18:36.540 like mindfulness books that'll help you calm down using science i would like to sort of shift my 0.98
00:18:41.940 vibes from angry snarky lawyer to like gwyneth paltrow yeah get get a smoothie peter so fascism
00:18:48.780 and communism those are the biggies uh the the other two and uh obviously a major thesis of his
00:18:56.200 is that both of them are more or less at this point done for good not that they would never
00:19:01.380 appear again but that they are not in serious competition for global ideological domination
00:19:07.880 right fukiyama really seems to think that the military defeat of fascist states in world war
00:19:13.160 two is enough to signal that fascism is dead oh interesting he says fascism was destroyed as a
00:19:20.520 living ideology by world war ii this was a defeat of course on a very material level but it amounted
00:19:26.760 to a defeat of the idea as well what destroyed fascism as an idea was not a universal moral
00:19:33.040 revulsion against it since plenty of people were willing to endorse the idea as long as it seemed
00:19:38.000 the wave of the future, but its lack of success. So he points out that no significant fascist
00:19:45.240 nations arose after World War II. Right. Nobody looked at fascism and was like,
00:19:49.540 let's do that. Right. And look, I think that's a little too clean cut of an argument. You know,
00:19:57.160 you can say that there are degrees to which like the regimes of Pinochet, for example,
00:20:01.640 to use that example again, or like Perón were fascist. They certainly had significant
00:20:06.900 elements of fascism. But more importantly, the fact that many of the governments popping up
00:20:12.940 across the world in the Cold War era were either communist or hard right capitalist
00:20:18.180 is a direct result of the fact that, again, they were being propped up by the Soviet Union and the
00:20:24.660 U.S. He describes all of these Cold War power struggles, again, as if they were just taking
00:20:29.240 place on the battlefield of ideas and not like the result of these powerful interests trying to
00:20:34.320 like very purposefully shape the world. It's also hopelessly naive about the nature of fascism.
00:20:40.420 Yes. Fascism isn't the kind of quote unquote idea that gets defeated in the marketplace of ideas.
00:20:45.260 Like my arguments were so good that no one did fascism anymore. Like fascism draws upon
00:20:51.060 deeply human impulses to like blame societal others for your problems and to allow a strong
00:20:57.820 man to manipulate your emotions. You know, if he's writing this in 1992, this is as the rise
00:21:03.000 of Slobodan Milosevic is happening right it's frustrating that Fukuyama's looking at this he's
00:21:08.940 like oh we defeated fascism like we don't need to worry about fascism coming back it's like oh it
00:21:13.520 doesn't work and it's like well it works in the short term it works really well in the short term
00:21:18.620 and it works really well if you're a fascist leader it's not really an idea in the same way
00:21:24.260 that like liberal democracy is right fascism is predicated on this in-group declaring themselves
00:21:31.880 the inheritors of the nation's power right how do you convince someone out of that you're not like
00:21:37.120 well what if other people had power right and you had less like that's i think you're
00:21:42.240 misunderstanding what the what they're trying to do they're trying to take the power because 0.87
00:21:45.900 they don't fucking care there's something kind of bleak about the fact that there's this huge 0.94
00:21:50.700 tranche of i think intellectual elites like the foreign policy establishment whatever you want 0.98
00:21:55.600 to call it, who seem to still think that politics is a battle of ideas.
00:22:00.680 I do wonder if End of History was just like his justification for the way we got here.
00:22:08.320 Because anyone in his position, a Rand Corporation State Department employee, knows that the
00:22:16.340 ascendance of these ostensibly liberal countries in the Cold War era was a brutal undertaking.
00:22:21.940 and if you had a hand in that brutality it might be comforting to tell yourself a little story
00:22:27.880 about how what actually happened was that the best most appealing ideas triumphed over their
00:22:33.480 competitors yeah that's my pet theory about what brought francis fukuyama to this point where he
00:22:39.680 writes this book he had to write it because he could not face god that's why 30 years later i
00:22:46.080 had to read it for a podcast so you know i almost didn't want to talk about his like analysis of
00:22:53.900 economics because he's out of his depth in like large portions of this book but maybe none more
00:23:00.320 than his economic stuff he talks as if there's no question that capitalism reflects like economic
00:23:06.620 liberation sure obviously that's just like hand waving and assuming away every critique of
00:23:12.180 capitalism that has ever been. And it just completely adopts this right-wing framework
00:23:16.940 where like free markets mean free people. There's a line worth pointing out from the original essay.
00:23:23.320 He says, Marx asserted that liberal society contained a fundamental contradiction that
00:23:29.280 could not be resolved within its context, that between capital and labor. And this contradiction
00:23:34.240 has constituted the chief accusation against liberalism ever since. But surely the class 0.94
00:23:40.260 issue has actually been successfully resolved in the west what uh wait that's the whole quote i
00:23:45.660 wish i could tell you that there's like another couple of lines that like really explains what
00:23:49.180 he's trying to say here but there's really not he gives a little more explanation it's that he says
00:23:54.160 quote the root causes of economic equality do not have to do with the underlying legal and social
00:23:59.820 structure of our society which remains fundamentally egalitarian whatever what he's saying is that like
00:24:06.660 Yeah, there are problems, but they're not fundamental. They're not inherent to our system. Yeah. So anyway, that's a little snippet you can keep in your pocket the next time. See like an unhoused person who needs money for food. You can just say, hey, don't worry, bro. The class issue has been successfully resolved in the West.
00:24:26.080 But then what's so interesting about that, though, is that the extent to which the class
00:24:29.620 issue has been resolved is almost entirely a function of socialist structures that we
00:24:34.980 have placed for the redistribution of wealth.
00:24:37.480 I guess you could call it a triumph of capitalism if you want to, but it's a triumph of capitalism
00:24:42.100 plus redistribution and high taxes on wealthy people.
00:24:45.660 It's not like, oh, capitalism just like happened to solve this thing.
00:24:49.560 There's no scenario under which capitalism itself would provide money for unemployment,
00:24:54.240 for example, or for old age.
00:24:55.540 I think that what he's actually saying is that like society has agreed that Western capitalists, liberal democracy is the winner. And yes, inequality and poverty persist. But those people who have come out on the bottom of our system, they're just the natural and organic losers. And I don't give a shit. Right.
00:25:15.420 They don't factor into this like global consensus that he's describing. 1.00
00:25:20.040 They're just losers.
00:25:21.520 And like he's basically making this like very common conservative argument that like the fact that someone is impoverished or suffering is not something that you actually have to care about unless the conditions were unfair to begin with. 0.97
00:25:38.880 Right.
00:25:39.160 And they refuse to acknowledge that they were, of course.
00:25:42.240 Right.
00:25:42.420 That's the argument being made.
00:25:43.860 He just sort of dresses it up by using terminology like fundamentally egalitarian.
00:25:50.220 It's funny that in all of the discussion of this book and the fact that it still appears
00:25:54.520 in like so many, you know, undergraduate syllabi and stuff, I don't think that it's come across
00:25:58.980 how like fundamentally conservative it is.
00:26:01.240 He's a conservative.
00:26:02.100 He's a conservative.
00:26:03.060 And, you know, he was responsible in part for like the ascendance of the neoconservatives
00:26:10.380 in the 90s and their takeover of like the Bush administration, the neoconservative mindset that
00:26:17.760 led to the Iraq war was something that Fukuyama contributed to immensely. The idea that democracy
00:26:23.700 is the best system and therefore we should be spreading it across the globe by force if
00:26:29.100 necessary, right? That's something that was sort of extrapolated from Fukuyama and his peers to
00:26:35.100 the point where he ends up like having to distance himself from them. He does a lot of that where
00:26:38.960 like a few years later he has to write an essay being like i don't totally agree with what those
00:26:42.360 guys are saying all my friends keep becoming like incompetent fascists it's a strange thing 0.56
00:26:48.500 look around my facebook page everyone's a fascist now odd some people took my ideas and ran like a
00:26:55.100 little too fast with them it's hard to explain it's it's hard to explain the experience of
00:27:01.780 reading this book i imagine that it's basically the same thing as getting a very mild concussion
00:27:08.020 for like when you stand up after too quickly after sitting down for a long period of time
00:27:14.880 it really is a slog you know the opening chapters are about like latin america and the fall of the
00:27:22.760 soviet union and you feel like maybe he's going to be talking about history in like a meaningful
00:27:28.380 way but no those are the only chapters that are like that it gets rough real quick and then it
00:27:34.020 never stops. Most of the book is completely forgettable because it is very dense philosophy
00:27:41.620 stuff. And he does one of those things that philosophers do where they make up a philosophy
00:27:47.120 word, a word that's like meant to synthesize a bunch of complicated things, and then starts
00:27:53.240 like throwing that word around recklessly. Doing the old Gladwell.
00:27:57.700 By the end of the book, you're reading sentences that like don't make sense because
00:28:00.960 they're both hyper abstract and also using words that you just learned that have really vague
00:28:07.740 broad meanings. Nice. To give an example, the biggest example in the book, Fukuyama uses the
00:28:13.740 word thymos or thymus, which originates with Plato to refer to like the human desire to be
00:28:20.720 recognized. And, you know, this goes along with his theory of why democracy succeeds, right, to fill
00:28:27.300 that fundamental desire for recognition. Plato defined thymus as like almost like an instinct
00:28:33.720 that we have, something that is in conflict with our reason. Fukuyama defines it differently.
00:28:38.980 He says it's, quote, the seat of our judgment of worth. There's a chapter called The Rise and
00:28:45.100 Fall of Thymus. There's another called The Thymotic Origins of Work. Now, look, I don't
00:28:50.860 want to sound like anti-intellectual, but this is just fucking gibberish. It's just gibberish. 0.99
00:28:56.400 Well, he's just redefined the word recognition as thymus, right? Is it doing anything more?
00:29:01.340 I don't think so. I think that what he's trying to say is that we all have this, right? It's not
00:29:07.860 just a need for recognition. It's something that's like fundamental to our souls. Right.
00:29:12.640 So he's pulling this super abstract term thymus from Plato, redefining it to suit his needs in
00:29:20.700 a way that, by the way, like I checked in with various experts and they're all like,
00:29:24.460 we don't know why he's doing this. And then he uses the term in some form 243 times throughout
00:29:35.340 the book. Wait, really? Yes. What? That's more, by the way, than they say the word fuck in The
00:29:42.300 Departed, just to give you a sense of where we are. I'm going to send you an excerpt because I 0.95
00:29:48.280 think it's important to hear some of this out loud to understand what it feels like to read
00:29:55.620 this book he pulls a book out of a box and it says papa this will help
00:29:59.760 okay uh he says the desire for recognition arising out of thymos is a deeply paradoxical
00:30:09.220 phenomenon because the latter is the psychological seat of justice and selflessness while at the
00:30:15.360 same time being closely related to selfishness. Okay. The thymotic self demands recognition for
00:30:24.240 its own sense of the worthiness of things, both itself and of other people. Oh, I'm back on 0.98
00:30:31.140 maintenance phase. This is like some health grift, like he's about to sell me supplements.
00:30:35.260 This for 450 pages is what reading this book is like, Michael. I mean, I want to give the guy
00:30:42.220 some credit and i'm gonna imagine that if i thought about this for a bit it would be coherent 0.94
00:30:48.000 but this is the worst fucking type of writing thimos is the psychological seat of justice 0.93
00:30:54.980 and selflessness while at the same time being closely related to selfishness 0.97
00:31:00.840 i guess this is what you mean by you can't really debunk this stuff right no it's actually closer 0.96
00:31:06.620 to selfishness what can you even say here there's nothing he's saying god damn it see now you've 0.98
00:31:14.020 done to me what has happened to you because now i'm staring at this fucking paragraph 0.98
00:31:17.960 closer to the psychological seat of justice oh yeah it's just oh my god i i'm sorry i'm i'm so 0.92
00:31:26.420 happy that you're experiencing this now because this is what had that what happened to me
00:31:31.480 I understand the need every now and then to delve into abstraction.
00:31:37.320 It can be hard to understand things like love without abstraction, right?
00:31:42.340 But when you just do this page after page after page, you can't tell me that the reader
00:31:48.920 is learning something.
00:31:50.080 You just can't.
00:31:50.960 You just can't.
00:31:52.780 Anyway, I just wanted you to suffer with me.
00:31:55.360 I didn't really have more to say about this.
00:31:57.000 Thank you for bringing me into the dark tunnel that you've been in for the last couple of weeks.
00:32:03.900 That's why, by the way, I have nothing to say about the last half of this book because I was just like ripping through the pages being like, again, we're still doing this?
00:32:11.180 Like, is anything happening?
00:32:12.320 Am I learning something?
00:32:13.340 What's going on?
00:32:15.380 As I recall, that's where he makes like the argument, right, that like liberal democracies are the best or whatever.
00:32:20.660 Yeah, that's right.
00:32:21.780 I mean, although he's sort of constantly making it and never making it, he's always sort of touching on the ways in which he believes that liberal democracies are superior.
00:32:34.820 But he always falls back on that same basic argument that it is appealing to these base human desires, the desire for recognition.
00:32:45.840 And that is why liberalism and democracy succeed because they feed those desires and people need those things.
00:32:53.480 And all of his arguments sort of circle back to that point.
00:32:56.400 I don't want to get into like the human nature stuff, but I don't hate the argument that that's a big part of the appeal of democracy.
00:33:01.480 And I'm a proponent of democracy.
00:33:03.440 I don't want to like sit here on democracy on record.
00:33:07.580 I'll go on the books.
00:33:08.960 But I think what his problem is, is that he's seeing this this recognition as something that can only lead to good outcomes.
00:33:15.980 Yeah.
00:33:16.140 If you look at like Milosevic, the Balkan example, a lot of what he was doing was recognizing people's Serbian identities.
00:33:23.260 Yeah. 1.00
00:33:23.420 You've been tamped down and there's these minorities that are trying to take all of this from you. 1.00
00:33:28.420 Yeah. 1.00
00:33:28.580 That's a form of recognition, too.
00:33:30.440 Completely agree.
00:33:31.300 And that's why the book is so, like, just so arrogant.
00:33:35.620 This, like, whole idea to, like, evolve as a species for millions of years, try one form of political organization for, like, 200, only a few decades of which are even, like, a good faith effort.
00:33:49.600 Right, right.
00:33:50.300 And then declare that you have solved the problem of ordering society as if, like, all of history is a Disney movie and we're now just in this happily ever after phase.
00:33:59.960 Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
00:34:00.680 This is an analogy that will probably not resonate with most of our fans.
00:34:04.760 But when a sports team wins a championship, I'm already confused.
00:34:09.460 There's I knew this might not hit with you, Mike.
00:34:14.060 Walk me through it.
00:34:15.580 There's something that happens to the fan base where they become convinced that you
00:34:20.900 will win every championship for the next several years.
00:34:23.980 And they forget that it's hard to do.
00:34:27.740 And there's a lot of variables.
00:34:28.920 that's what it feels like it feels like this this book is the day after you win a championship being
00:34:35.740 like we're gonna win next year too yeah the same it's the same vibe and even worse because he's
00:34:43.200 publishing it right to look to look at like a million different interconnected events across
00:34:48.700 the globe and think that you could articulate a comprehensive theory of what's happening
00:34:53.820 Right. Right. Publishing this book titled, like, Society, an Explanation.
00:35:00.440 Just like, come on, man. Come on.
00:35:04.100 I don't know if he's ever reckoned with this, but I feel like he's right in that the world has become more liberal democratic, but he hasn't reckoned with how much he helped bring about the world that we have now, where a lot of countries have quietly backslid into authoritarianism.
00:35:22.260 because they still look like liberal democracies on the surface.
00:35:26.480 Right.
00:35:26.800 There's this real like complacence that this thesis breeds.
00:35:31.380 Yeah.
00:35:31.720 History is marching toward a single future.
00:35:34.500 And therefore, you don't really need to worry about these nascent threats so much, right?
00:35:39.360 Things will work themselves out.
00:35:40.940 You think about just like how quickly the tide has turned on LGBT rights,
00:35:45.640 where even with like popular acceptance being super high,
00:35:50.740 it really feels like we're losing yeah how did that happen i think if i could like sum it up
00:35:55.900 quickly it's because a lot of liberals forgot that they were in a fight yeah and fukuyama does this
00:36:00.860 very jarringly when he talks about apartheid oh which he says failed because of a loss of
00:36:08.840 legitimacy among white south africans oh you know he does not mention the stroke the years of struggle
00:36:15.020 and protest by black south africans doesn't mention nelson mandela who got out of prison
00:36:20.360 between fukuyama publishing the essay and publishing the book like right there's a
00:36:25.440 detachment that makes these people i guess i would say sort of amoral in a way right right
00:36:33.120 he never has like put himself out there in any meaningful way and whenever someone took his
00:36:39.320 ideas and ran with it it was always awful right he has like at no point in his career
00:36:45.660 fought for anything other than like the basic idea that liberalism and democracy is good.
00:36:52.920 I've digested an enormous amount of his work and I still barely know what he believes.
00:37:00.120 Right.
00:37:00.520 In like any meaningful sense.
00:37:02.280 It's also, it was very smart of him to write an unreadable book because nobody's going to go back
00:37:06.940 and find like specific passages that debunk him. Like this is the Paul Ehrlich move where like,
00:37:12.400 even when you make specific predictions about the future, like there will be large scale famines
00:37:17.320 and then those famines don't happen. All anybody remembers is like, this guy seems like a smart
00:37:22.740 dude. Like he really has the finger on the pulse. And like you, you never fall out of polite
00:37:27.360 discourse because nobody goes back and actually reads your specific words. And in Fukuyama's case,
00:37:32.780 no one understands what the fuck he was trying to say. Right. I mean, and you can, you can even 0.96
00:37:36.740 see like how the discourse plays out where someone's like, Hey, you had a book that said
00:37:41.280 liberal democracy was going to be the basic form of human government forever based you know more
00:37:48.420 or less and then he he gets to be like aha no you didn't understand uh what i said was that
00:37:55.260 right the thematic response to liberal democracy is such that and then like you're just like what 0.97
00:38:02.260 what what the fuck like he gets to take you into a place where you're totally uncomfortable because 0.81
00:38:08.000 he's literally created his own vocabulary. Peter, are you saying that thymos isn't the 0.99
00:38:12.880 psychological seat of justice and selfishness while at the same time being closely related
00:38:16.840 to selflessness? What I'm saying is that the thymotic self demands recognition for its own
00:38:21.880 sense of the worthiness of things. We both have this fucking text in the window in front of us, 0.98
00:38:27.060 just staring at it like my head tilted like a golden retriever the whole episode. 0.99
00:38:33.360 what the fuck is he talking about it's so unfair that we're not allowed to call someone like this 1.00
00:38:41.600 stupid it's less offensive to me to just be bad at math yeah yeah than it is to write something 1.00
00:38:47.900 like this i feel like fukuyama is is less of an interesting beast than the kind of person he is 0.97
00:38:54.940 and the times that birthed him right like this is like the formation of sort of the ideas industry
00:39:00.740 and this this kind of fetishization of ideas ideas are going to save us right right and i think one
00:39:06.760 of the ways you remain popular in like places like davos you can't really get down in the muck
00:39:13.500 of actually wanting anything yeah and you don't want to actually do any fighting for these ideas
00:39:18.380 because all of a sudden people are going to pull back and be like oh it seems like you're doing
00:39:21.700 politics whereas like this is ideas but then what's the point of an ideas industry if it doesn't
00:39:26.740 actually become policy somewhere. Right. Like these people want the seriousness and the
00:39:31.540 credibility of people who are meaningfully linked to politics, but they don't want to actually like
00:39:36.340 do the boring stuff of supporting one political outcome or another. Right. He's Dr. Manhattan on
00:39:43.780 Mars. Like I'm tired of being caught in the tangle of these people's lives. I mean, that's actually
00:39:48.220 really good for it. Yes. He just sort of like watching everything like the fucking magi.
00:39:51.840 And, you know, in general, it's hard not to look at, like, the post-2016 era of international politics and not think, like, it seems like maybe the whole communism, fascism, capitalism thing hasn't been quite hashed out, right? 0.98
00:40:07.600 Right.
00:40:07.780 You know, the thesis took its initial hit on 9-11, which really opened up this like
00:40:12.180 new narrative of civilizational struggle and the Great Recession hits and many neoliberal
00:40:18.880 economies and cultures have shown signs of fracture that never really repaired after
00:40:23.580 that.
00:40:24.540 And, you know, if I could like summarize quickly what I think he missed here, it's like,
00:40:30.080 will liberal democracy provide what it promised to provide?
00:40:33.440 He thought that if it didn't, we would simply tinker with it until it did.
00:40:36.960 Right.
00:40:37.440 You steadily improve upon the system.
00:40:40.300 But what actually happens is that after many decades of unsuccessful tinkering, inequality
00:40:46.120 worsening, cost of living not being matched by wage growth, all of these things, many
00:40:51.400 people come to like the fairly reasonable conclusion that maybe the problem is systemic.
00:40:56.120 He thought that these were just minor tensions that would be resolved.
00:40:58.600 But maybe they are base issues that weaken the legitimacy of the liberal order over time.
00:41:04.420 And what's weird is there is an incredibly poignant part of his essay that I think is
00:41:10.620 spot on.
00:41:11.300 He says, the end of history will be a very sad time.
00:41:14.560 The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal,
00:41:19.220 the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism
00:41:24.260 will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems,
00:41:29.520 environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.
00:41:33.740 Oh, God, that's bleak.
00:41:36.100 It is. And a very prescient description of the neoliberal malaise of like the 90s and the 2000s.
00:41:42.860 Right. And if he had framed this essay as a prediction of like what the next couple of decades would look like rather than the next couple of centuries, I think you could argue that he was on point or that he was like getting something very real.
00:41:56.000 Right. Right. I mean, people are coming and saying my life sucks. And Fukuyama is just like tapping the sign like, well, we are a fundamentally egalitarian country. So the problem's been solved. Right. There's only so long you can tap that sign before people are like, fuck that sign. Right. Right. Shit sucks for me.
00:42:15.780 I've listened to a bunch of interviews with Fukuyama and read some pieces by him where 1.00
00:42:22.420 it feels like he should be answering the question, was your thesis wrong?
00:42:28.480 And I've never heard him say no.
00:42:31.140 Okay.
00:42:31.600 But I've heard him make a ton of concessions.
00:42:33.980 Ooh, issuing correction on a previous post of mine regarding FIMUS.
00:42:38.280 So, 2022 was a big year for Fukuyama because Russia got itself into a little bit of trouble.
00:42:46.640 Oh, yeah.
00:42:47.320 And in October, he publishes a piece for The Atlantic titled,
00:42:53.480 More Proof That This Really Is the End of History.
00:42:56.960 Yes. 1.00
00:42:58.280 Go, girl. 1.00
00:42:59.160 Give us nothing. 1.00
00:43:00.380 Did you read this?
00:43:01.120 I did read this.
00:43:02.220 And it was, I was going to do my little shtick, kind of like live tweet,
00:43:05.560 reading it and, like, highlight passages and being like, I don't know that I agree with this stuff.
00:43:09.160 But, like, I couldn't fucking highlight anything because he's not saying anything in it. 0.81
00:43:14.040 It's trying to grab water. 0.94
00:43:15.160 But then I don't even understand how Russia invading Ukraine proves his point. I feel 0.51
00:43:18.620 like it unproves his point because this is, like, the rise of authoritarianism.
00:43:22.140 No, no, no. The problem for Russia, of course, is that they're not doing well.
00:43:28.600 Okay.
00:43:28.920 I'm sending you an excerpt from the new essay where he sort of lays out again his thesis.
00:43:36.380 Okay. No authoritarian government presents a society that is in the long term more attractive
00:43:41.460 than liberal democracy and could therefore be considered the goal or end point of historical
00:43:45.740 progress. The millions of people voting with their feet, leaving poor, corrupt, or violent
00:43:50.420 countries for life not in Russia, China, or Iran, but in the liberal democratic West,
00:43:54.520 amply demonstrate this. So this is Fukuyama trying to like reset the discussion a little bit.
00:44:03.420 Right. He's doing his Fukuyama thing where he's like saying a bunch of true facts,
00:44:08.140 but he's using them to reach a conclusion that is not justified by them at all. He's basically
00:44:13.200 saying that like people don't like living under dictatorships, which sort of depends on the
00:44:18.240 dictatorship. Like some in-groups are actually quite happy to live in authoritarian states.
00:44:22.400 And then he's like, oh, well, everybody's leaving so you can tell they don't like living under dictatorships. But like people leave countries for like a really wide range of reasons. Like one of the highest out migration rates in the world is Lithuania because it's in the EU and people can just like really easily move to other countries and make more money. It's not a dictatorship. And like he has to know this, right? World immigration trends are not driven by one factor.
00:44:49.560 You know, he's like, people are leaving Iran. And it's like, well, we have used sanctions to completely cut them off from the rest of the world. So I guess I get I mean, that's true in some regards. But is that really a good example? Right. I don't know. I'm half Orion. And so this sort of makes me lose my mind a little more than it usually would. 0.99
00:45:06.720 You have the control F ready.
00:45:08.220 it's just sort of like come come on like you can't discuss the economic situation in iran
00:45:16.420 as like the manifestation of ideology yeah he has to write this piece because it's been 30 years
00:45:24.000 since he published the book and he sort of seems to be wrong right liberal democracy appears to
00:45:30.020 be on the decline globally not permanently ascendant and he's subtly changing the discussion
00:45:37.260 by saying no authoritarian government presents a society that is in the long term more attractive
00:45:43.800 than liberal democracy, constantly pushing it further into the future. His thesis did not
00:45:50.120 predict what is happening globally right now. If he were honest, he would be like,
00:45:55.780 I missed something here, right? I was a little too conclusive or whatever.
00:46:00.560 But instead, he's like, one day it'll be liberal democracy forever.
00:46:04.340 God, it's the political philosophy equivalent of self-driving cars where they're just always five years away for like a good Sonic the Hedgehog 3D game.
00:46:14.040 Maybe the next one.
00:46:15.220 He makes this case in the early 90s that breeds a complacency that I think you can credibly argue leads to liberal backslide just a couple decades later.
00:46:27.780 And then he like writes about liberal backslide like, oh, this is bad.
00:46:31.300 You know?
00:46:34.340 He recently did an interview with a Vox podcast and he was asked about Chinese communism, sort of.
00:46:41.320 Is that a model that is a threat to liberal democracy? 0.95
00:46:44.940 And he said, yes, Chinese communism could prevail. 0.92
00:46:48.060 And then he said, quote, I don't pretend to have any insight into the future. 0.99
00:46:52.360 And I almost jumped off my fucking roof. 1.00
00:46:57.100 Yes, you do, motherfucker. 1.00
00:46:58.780 You did pretend. 1.00
00:46:59.740 Now, I wouldn't be so presumptuous. 1.00
00:47:01.820 I read your stupid 450-page book about predicting the future, 0.99
00:47:07.520 and then you're going to tell me that you don't pretend to have any insight? 1.00
00:47:10.280 Yeah. 1.00
00:47:10.820 You bastard. 1.00