00:00:28.340I'm Elizabeth Smart, and these are The Survivor Files.
00:00:31.940Every week, I'm with survivors who live through the unthinkable, abducted, stalked, controlled, and nearly silenced.
00:00:39.480These are stories about what it takes to make it out alive.
00:00:43.320Listen to The Survivor Files with Elizabeth Smart on the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts.
00:00:50.940If your bookshelf and your For You page are equally important to your personality, welcome home.
00:00:56.660Pro Society is a weekly podcast that's part book club, part group chat for anyone who thinks Pride and Prejudice and Love Island deserve the same level of discourse.
00:01:05.300Each week, we're connecting the dots between books, the internet, and pop culture with your favorite writers, book talk creators, and plenty of overthought opinions.
00:03:07.400It is your duty to ensure that today's radicals are not tomorrow's employees, a video describing
00:03:12.920the project explains. Caroline Cinders and their colleague, Sam, are part of Convocation
00:03:18.160Research and Design, or CORDS for short. They help people who are being doxed or are at risk
00:03:23.460for being doxed, train people on how to stay safe both online and off while engaging in protest,
00:03:28.560and advocate for technology to be designed in more responsible ways.
00:03:32.360When I first caught up with Caroline and Sam, I thought this whole conversation would be pretty
00:03:36.780straightforward. You know, turn off your phone at a protest, that kind of thing. But as we spoke,
00:03:42.200Caroline and Sam described just how charged of a landscape we're talking about.
00:03:46.760And I realized the conversation is so much more complicated than that.
00:03:55.620So when I first reached out to y'all to do this episode, I thought it was going to be a pretty basic guide for how folks protesting on campus and off campus can stay safe digitally.
00:04:05.480I thought we'd be talking about pretty basic things like use a passcode to unlock your phone so that if you're detained by police, they have a harder time getting into it or cover any distinctive tattoos, that kind of thing.
00:04:17.360But then when you and I started talking, I realized there was so much more going on here and that I needed to take a step back.
00:04:24.380You all told me about things like provocateurs setting up fake dating profiles and then going on fake dates with protesters and trying to secretly record them saying things to make them look bad, James O'Keefe style, or how right-wing influencers are kind of selling themselves as citizen journalists and trying to make names for themselves by engineering viral content of protesters looking bad, on top of threats to protesters that you might traditionally think of, you know, threats from campus administration or police.
00:04:54.380So can you just give us kind of the lay of the land in terms of the threats that these student protesters are facing right now?
00:05:04.140I think student activists are seeing threats not only from outside, but from inside as well.
00:05:11.360So they're having to contend with school administration, sometimes hostile students who are against what they are protesting for, as well as outside forces like the police or outside sometimes infiltrators,
00:05:34.260There's, like, people like Project Veritas style, where they're trying to, like, get into protests in order to record people who they perceive as their political opposition in order to make them look bad.
00:05:49.600And then posting that on the Internet for clout or subscriptions or money, as well as a variety of other threats that I think a lot of people don't really take into account.
00:06:02.680So you talked about people doing this for clout or engagement. Do you think that's a big undercurrent of what we're seeing here? Like people who are like, oh, this is a great opportunity to put out some viral video that makes a protester look bad or look uninformed or look threatening or dangerous. I'll put that online and become a superstar myself.
00:06:21.200I mean, we are more in a time of the kind of like citizen journalists, some of them call themselves, or like man on the street interviews, where those are very popular on like TikTok or Instagram or Twitter or YouTube or Rumble.
00:06:36.960Like the list goes on and on of all these different platforms that they're able to monetize these videos for. And it is very big in the cultural climate that these protests are happening in.
00:06:51.200Um, so yes and no, like they are a small part of these protests, but any large event, I
00:07:00.700feel like, um, that's having, happening collectively in the country is going to have probably a
00:07:08.360similar amount of people that are chasing it for some type of engagement.
00:07:13.520And just to build on that, you know, I really do think we are in like the age of the influencer.
00:07:18.220Like, I think that is something a lot of folks would feel comfortable saying. It is really hard to say, you know, citation needed in terms of how many folks are attending these protests in person or following them online, right? And commenting in a way that is related to influencer or citizen journalism.
00:07:39.660Like, there are a variety of organizations that are trying to identify student protesters and dox them and put their information online.
00:07:48.240Like, one that comes to mind is Khmeri Mission, for example.
00:07:51.660But, you know, there are a lot of folks that are either, or not a lot, but there are definitely folks that are showing up to the protests that are, we could argue, have, you know, maybe some more malicious intentions that are in this more citizen journalism or influencer space.
00:08:08.780But there's also lots of folks watching online, trying to identify different folks at these protests and sort of doing a kind of, let's say, like recap or analysis.
00:08:21.860And this is stuff, you know, we've seen in many other different kinds of spaces and ways.
00:08:26.900Like what comes to mind for me is, you know, the Johnny Depp Amber Heard trial where we saw so many sort of armchair investigators and heavy, heavy quotes.
00:08:38.780Like this, this is the lip readers and things like that. And, and, and, but that had like a real impact on how people really perceived that trial. And how, I would argue in really discoloring Amber Heard, not as a victim, but as a perpetrator, when in fact, she was a victim, right.
00:08:59.260And so I think, you know, we're still seeing a lot of that here and now with folks, I think, also maybe not physically being at the protest, but commenting on them, analyzing them, right, and providing different kinds of, like, wrongful assessments.
00:09:16.320And similar to what we saw with the Amber Heard-Johnny Depp trial, have you seen that those kind of armchair folks who aren't necessarily involved in the protest but are like, you know, commenting on the viral video they saw from the protest or whatever, that that is having an impact on how everyday people are perceiving what's going on on college campuses across the country?
00:09:41.460I think it's leading to like a stratification for sure. And I think some of that is also, you know, I would argue actually also coming from a place, even of sadly, like traditional media, one of the things I like to highlight is we don't live in a harassment literate society.
00:09:57.720And I think a lot of the analysis that is sort of existing around this particular conflict, right, is sort of caught up in a really lack of nuance, right?
00:10:12.180So the inability to see, let's say, the people of Gaza as individuals, that we are watching a genocide unfold, that we are watching things where many respected, reputable international bodies, right, are weighing in and saying, like, this is unprecedented in terms of like a famine that's being caused, in terms of the attack, in terms of the amount of journalists killed, in terms of the amount of children that are killed in this particular conflict, right?
00:10:41.960And a lot of what I think is happening is a version of context collapse in which I think some folks are weaponizing anti-Semitism to push for other agendas.
00:10:58.800And that is also creating a space in which it's very difficult to have, one could argue, a nuanced conversation, right?
00:11:05.780And I think that is a large part of this.
00:11:10.260And then from there, that kind of gives bad actors a space to push different kinds of agendas and different kinds of information. And also in a way, almost again, like justify the doxing of different activists. Right.
00:11:25.300um and so i think it's um sort of hard to like definitively say but i do see um on on like the
00:11:37.880you know on the like right or conservative end uh this sort of lack of nuance and inability to
00:11:44.340understand like a a human rights conflict really muddying the waters in terms of also how do you
00:11:51.900contextualize or talk about, let's say like student protesters. So we talked a lot about like
00:11:58.740media entities, I guess I'll say, who are known provocateurs that like nobody should trust.
00:12:04.740But I do think that national reporting is not all, is not, I have not seen a lot of national
00:12:10.360reporting that is super clear about what is going on. Like the fact that we're talking about 19,
00:12:16.000like a 19-year-old college freshman or something being up against a coordinated, organized, well-funded institution with a mission to dox them and make them look bad, right?
00:12:28.440And so, like, I don't feel like we are really getting a lot of opportunities to have that full story told.
00:12:35.840I think that the way that you've described it, Caroline, as like we just don't live in a harassment literate society where, you know, the actual context of what that would be like and what and like why that is happening is not being reflected, perhaps.
00:12:50.200And I guess I wonder, like, how can we get to a place where that story is being told more honestly, where people really understand that, like, yeah, you're talking about a college student and then a billionaire funds a truck with their picture and their name on it to drive around their campus, right? Or, like, how truly fucked up that really is.
00:13:11.020Totally. And thank you so much for that. I don't know how we get towards a harassment literate society. That's why I'm really grateful for podcasts like No Girls on the Internet. So I've been really grateful for a lot of the programming we've seen across different kinds of civil society organizations. I've been extremely grateful for Teen Vogue and its existence over the past few years.0.98
00:13:34.540I think a lot of this is really sort of insisting on having nuanced conversations.
00:13:41.800But I think a lot of it also actually does come down to different kinds of education.
00:13:48.340And I don't know at what level that should happen or exist in.
00:13:52.920Like, for example, with our organization, we don't really work a lot with children for a variety of reasons.
00:13:58.160Some of that is also just like regulatory reasons.
00:14:01.540It's not one of our advocacy focuses because children are like under 18.
00:14:06.000They're just a different legal group than adults.
00:14:09.680But, you know, I think there's something to be said around how do we how do we sort of talk about things like digital harm and also offline harm?
00:14:20.320But I think that this is also an issue that adults run into as well.
00:14:23.700Like, you can't necessarily summarize, I think, often, or I think it's difficult to summarize a lot of harassment cases into a tweet, right, to summarize it in a few characters.
00:14:37.320And I think in this sort of space of us trying to maybe editorialize or, you know, take a stance on something that often really collapses the nuance of what we're talking about.
00:14:51.860I also think that there is like a binary in which people tend to approach good and bad and that sort of weighs into harassment.
00:15:02.980I think that there is also a deeper context here.
00:15:05.740So this is one of the things I've noticed in some of the trainings we do with folks that are like victims that are facing harassment or have been harassed.
00:15:16.020Like and I've also noticed this with folks that are, let's say, end up being friends of harassers.
00:15:20.100It can be very destabilizing and difficult to sort of come to terms with that someone
00:15:25.080you care about might harm someone else.
00:15:27.900Folks often I've found in my experience, so this is like in my observations, like they'll
00:15:35.640sort of reflect on their own personal feelings about it, right?
00:22:15.680If your bookshelf and your For You page are equally important to your personality, welcome home.
00:22:22.000This is Prose Society, the weekly podcast that's part book club, part group chat for thought daughters, pop culture obsessives, and anyone who thinks Pride and Prejudice and Love Island deserve the same level of discourse.
00:22:34.400I'm Eli Rallo, and every week we're connecting the dots between books, the internet, and the conversations everyone can't stop having.
00:22:41.420I'm going to have to look up this story.
00:22:44.600from best-selling authors and your favorite book talk creators to the latest pop culture moments
00:22:49.580nothing is off the table it's like if you can hide some real messages inside compelling
00:22:56.140characters and that is a trojan horse whether you're looking for literary deep dives smart
00:23:01.420pop culture conversations or a community of readers who love to think a little too much
00:23:06.180you're in the right place listen to pro society on the iheart radio app apple podcasts or wherever
00:23:12.640you get your podcasts. See you between the pages. And we're back. It reminds me so much of what we
00:23:26.340saw around Gamergate in some ways. And just this idea that it's so much about like what's happening
00:23:33.520is maybe not so complex. The feelings surrounding it might be the complex thing. And then the bit
00:23:39.860where we then don't have a media that is informed enough
00:23:44.880or harassment literate enough to really lay out what's happening, right?
00:23:49.800And so they try to find a way of like reporting along those binaries of like,
00:23:54.720well, maybe they really do just care about ethics and game journalism.0.80
00:24:00.400And like, maybe this woman really did deserve it and have it coming.1.00
00:24:03.560And maybe, you know, maybe women have taken things too far1.00
00:24:07.060in their criticism of gaming or whatever,0.99
00:24:08.840Rather than actually laying out the sort of complexities that you did and the nuance that you just did, it's so much easier to have it be this binary, simple thing.
00:24:20.180And I almost wonder if they're like giving us what we want in a kind of way, because we want simple answers sometimes.
00:24:26.160We want like, oh, bad guy, good guy, or here's the reason they did that.
00:24:30.040And sometimes what we don't want is like, oh, well, it's actually a really complicated situation.
00:24:34.680Totally. I mean, this is something I see where I talk about a lot in my coaching with different victims of harassment is that one of the very unsatisfying things that comes out of harassment, there's many unsatisfying things, there's many awful things, there's many harmful things, is that you might never get a why.
00:24:56.880and the why might be something that feels simplistic or minimal or naive or you know
00:25:05.480not even very well thought out and one of the things um I I try to really coach people through
00:25:13.420is it might also not be worth thinking about why like it might actually you know it is you're being
00:25:20.600targeted but it might not have anything to do with you and in terms of seeking the why like
00:25:26.340why this person is doing this, that might not give you the peace of mind or the closure that
00:25:32.760you're looking for. And I think that's also, I think that's really hard for people. And I know
00:25:38.700that when I have faced harassment, sometimes that's even hard for me, even though I know that.
00:25:44.580I know that if someone were to tell me why, it wouldn't be the answer that I'm looking for. It
00:25:51.740maybe wouldn't solve any of the conflicting feelings I'm feeling about that particular
00:25:57.520instance. And I think, you know, this is where it is sometimes important to separate harassment
00:26:02.620research and harassment like literature from, let's say, international politics, and war and
00:26:08.360conflict. But, but I do, I do think it is at times and important to sort of understand like,
00:26:14.480the why can be incredibly simplistic and heavy quotes. Like I think a lot about
00:26:21.140my partner's family. He was born in 1991 in the Western Balkans when Yugoslavia was breaking
00:26:27.800apart. And like, what are the whys there? There's a lot of whys that Yugoslavia was breaking apart.
00:26:35.240There's a lot of whys in which a group, different groups were targeted. And a lot of those whys are
00:26:40.820not satisfying you know because it comes down to um hate and discrimination and islamophobia
00:26:47.680and like very entrenched um like ethnic ties and views of a particular region and that's an overly
00:26:56.420simplistic way to even look right at that region but that's also a why and that doesn't explain or
00:27:02.720excuse anything and i also don't know if that improves what um what it feels like to have lived
00:27:09.320through that, that's just an observation, right? And I think sometimes, you know, sometimes the
00:27:16.120most awful things that happen, there is a simple answer, again, which is unsatisfying, which is
00:27:21.140just we live in a society that is full of bias and hate and power differentials.
00:27:28.540True, but I can see how that's not the most satisfying answer, particularly if you've been
00:27:35.620in a situation that has, like, upended your life, right?
00:27:38.500Like, if you're like, oh, someone got a picture of me at a protest
00:27:41.660and now I am unable to live a normal life,
00:27:44.300having the answer be like, oh, well, we live in a society
00:27:48.400that's full of hate, that people, somebody identified you
00:27:51.780as an easy target to pick on and that's what they did.
00:27:54.760I could see how that could be unsatisfying,
00:27:57.000but it goes back to what you said about sometimes the why
00:28:03.320Totally, and this is something where I'd like to say, like,
00:28:05.620that also doesn't excuse the harm you're facing. Like, like you shouldn't be facing that, right?
00:28:09.540Like that's something that no one should be exact, exacting or putting on to you for you to
00:28:14.920experience. Which I think is why Sam and I really do focus on victims, their care, what are the ways
00:28:23.760in which systems inadvertently or, you know, via their own design, create, create flaws and
00:28:31.680vulnerabilities and spaces for harm. Because I don't need to know the why to focus on the victim.
00:28:38.100We don't need to know the why to support someone. And even for us, I think even if I were to put on
00:28:43.980my research hat, the why isn't also a satisfying thing for me to seek personally, even in a research
00:28:51.740context. So you might be listening to this and think that it sounds like I'm trying to dissuade
00:28:57.500you from showing up to a protest IRL because you could find yourself a target for this kind of
00:29:02.120harassment, surveillance, and criminalization. But Caroline and Sam don't see it that way.
00:29:07.020In fact, they say that you should still make your voice heard while also having a good
00:29:11.480understanding of the realities of our surveillance landscape and what's at stake.
00:29:16.020When I reached out, I thought this conversation was going to be a lot more simple than it ended
00:29:20.100up being. And I think that is reflective of the need to talk about this whole conversation in a
00:29:26.580way that is surveillance literate, right? That like, really takes into account the full sense
00:29:31.460of like, why experts like yourselves recommend, make certain recommendations to people, how it
00:29:37.420connects to a larger criminalization and surveillance landscape when it comes to things
00:29:43.040like protest and dissent. And so I wonder, like, do you think we live in a surveillance literate
00:29:48.720society? And do you think people have a good sense of like, how these things are all connected?
00:29:53.540Oh, absolutely. Absolutely not. We do not live in a surveillance literate society. I mean, there's just the capabilities of state and non-state actors is not really completely understood.
00:30:09.460I feel like people are oftentimes, protesters or activists, shall we say, are oftentimes operating with a knowledge base that's maybe like 5, 10, 15 years, even sometimes backdated.
00:30:22.020Or sometimes people will just be like, oh, well, the adversary, maybe the state, we'll say that's the adversary in this example, is so advanced that why should I even bother?
00:30:33.560Like they can read everything that I'm doing. They can read by mind. Basically, they're just that capable. Not the case. The opposition is oftentimes not as sophisticated as we think.
00:30:51.920and there are things that we can implement best practices in digital security and privacy
00:30:59.020that we can implement that will keep us safer um and it's like super simple stuff like you signal
00:31:07.620with disappearing messages for communications like don't just use text messages or or phone calls like
00:31:13.720um super simple stuff like that um will keep people safer um like you said in the beginning
00:31:20.700of this podcast, like don't have a face unlock on your phone or fingerprint unlock on your phone
00:31:26.900because the cops, if you are arrested, can just take the phone and hold it up to your face and
00:31:31.960then unlock your phone. Stuff like that. But backing up a little to surveillance, you know,
00:31:39.840the capacity for surveillance is really increased with the proliferation of AI-assisted facial
00:31:49.520recognition or um you know hd cameras that can do like a thousand x zoom and still have like 4k
00:31:59.500quality um or even like we could talk about all the different optics that are on like helicopter
00:32:06.220cameras police helicopter cameras that can like see in thermal in infrared in in different heat
00:32:12.000signature patterns in um you know movement uh outlines and stuff like that um to where
00:32:19.960they can also like zoom in to where they can essentially see a protestor's screen on their
00:32:26.360phone from a helicopter that type of stuff um or or just like super stuff that's been around for
00:32:33.020like decades like police poll cams that they'll just like stick somewhere and people just won't
00:32:37.360notice or um aplars automatic license plate readers to to kind of map like where people
00:32:44.220are driving around um all of these things they exist they're in the real world and they're used
00:32:49.800by law enforcement on a daily basis almost and this is just like the physical world that we're
00:32:55.940talking about this isn't even the digital world where we're talking about like um them having the
00:33:02.040capabilities of seeing all of your social media accounts interlinked and and essentially pulled
00:33:09.980together in one little package deal that is maybe like this is Sam like this is his Facebook this
00:33:16.700is his Instagram this is his Tumblr this is his MySpace from 15 years ago they have these
00:33:22.800capabilities, but we can do things to prevent them from having fuller access to them. We can
00:33:32.500make things private. We can have burner accounts, burner emails, burner phone numbers,
00:33:37.820things that aren't maybe directly associated with us. And again, this does boil back down to
00:33:43.180best practices in digital security and privacy. Yeah. I have heard the feeling like, oh, the state,
00:33:51.100They have everything about me. Why bother? I've heard that described as like a kind of nihilism, like surveillance nihilism, where you're like, it doesn't even matter anymore.
00:34:01.400I like I get it because the list of ways the state surveils us is vast. And I could see I could I totally understand that as a reaction.
00:43:02.640Yeah, I'm almost cringing a little bit because I definitely went to a meeting where we all put our phones in the freezer because somebody saw it on the Snowden dock.
00:43:10.700And then I definitely, like, logged on to Starbucks Wi-Fi.
00:43:14.180I had a whole conversation about what we talked about via Starbucks Wi-Fi, via just SMS messengers.
00:43:20.140I was like, oh, well, it felt cool to put our phones in the freezer, but I took no other
00:43:28.140security steps that day and, in fact, did things that were risky that a little common
00:43:33.720sense basic considerations would have probably been more effective or made a bigger impact
00:43:40.720on my security than like, let's all put our phones in the freezer.
00:43:46.820And I think, Caroline, you made a point about people not being tech experts. I wonder, you know, in 2024, with the ubiquity of smartphones and facial recognition technology and doxing and like all of these technological innovations and advancements, do you think that folks feel a barrier to protest or to speak up and use their voices because it seems like, oh, this is so much?
00:44:12.680This is so opaque. Some of the guides and way that people talk about technology and security feels not accessible.
00:44:20.600So I'm just going to, like, not show up because who has the time? Like, I wonder, is that something that you've seen in your work?
00:44:26.300So I haven't personally seen that. And some of that I will highlight might be from where we sit as an organization, because we tend to work with other community organizations.
00:44:36.960we tend to work with human rights defenders, journalists, activists, and then members of
00:44:43.120the general public who like want to engage with this knowledge. So I would say that like I haven't
00:44:48.980seen necessarily a deterrence. What I have seen is people showing up but still being scared and
00:44:55.320or showing up and then something bad happens and they weren't prepared, let's say, for what was
00:45:05.320happening and I want to highlight that's not their that's not their fault like we live under
00:45:09.860surveillance capitalism how software and hardware has been designed is not the fault of the user or
00:45:15.580or the vulnerable individual that's the fault of capitalism and big tech and like a lot of
00:45:21.400not regulation we have in the United States right and so I think luckily at least you know again
00:45:28.620And also we're speaking from a very specific sort of space, convocation, our lab, in which we are often engaging with people that are, you know, human rights defenders, journalists, activists, community organizations.
00:45:42.060So we haven't seen a hesitation, but what we have seen is people recognizing that there are like skills and tools that they need that they don't have.
00:45:53.500And they're seeing that also in real time, I think, right now, because of the amount of doxing attempts that are happening on social media. And so I think that's weighing into where people are now a bit more aware, you know, there's been many stories, as you pointed out, with billionaires renting buses and putting people's faces on them or putting people's names on them.
00:46:17.640And I think that is, you know, causing folks to reflect and be like, oh, like, that could be me. And I still need to show up. I still want to show up. But how do I how do I create or maintain some safety, knowing that that is a potential outcome? So that's a little bit more of, I think, what we've been seeing.
00:46:35.560I started this conversation wanting to use the focus or framing of like campus protesters, campus activists, and what's happening on campuses right now. But have you seen these same tactics being used to target anybody, like people who are not necessarily protesters, who maybe work for companies that are like deemed too woke or have in some way have been like perceived as ideologically against the bad actors who are doing the doxing?
00:47:01.860Like, is this the kind of threat that really all of us might need to be aware of whether or not we've ever set foot on an IRL protest on a campus?
00:47:11.320I would say so. I would say with how, you know, regardless of the country you live in, with how politics have been going over the past few years, it is always good.
00:47:23.400it's very important to be thinking about your own digital footprint, the amount of data that's out
00:47:30.180there about you, and how it can be used or misused to harm you. I think that that's something we all
00:47:37.500now especially really need to be thinking about. I don't want people to listen to this episode
00:47:43.100and think every threat that we have discussed is something that they personally are likely to
00:47:51.500become a target for? Like, I don't want people to be paranoid. I want people to be informed and
00:47:56.140smart. Right. And I guess like in your work, how have you prepared people to understand like their
00:48:03.000specific, their specific needs in this whole conversation? Oh gosh, I think this is one of
00:48:07.540the hardest things. This is where, this is why we do, I think really targeted workshops, but,
00:48:12.800but Sam, do you want to, do you want to weigh in? The answer is threat modeling. Oh, I knew you were
00:48:20.620going to say that. I was going to say it, but Sam is going to say it. Well, we all have different
00:48:26.180threat models, right? And what Caro's threat model is going to be way different than mine
00:48:30.880and what Bridget's is going to be way different than Caro's. Threat modeling is the process
00:48:36.420of trying to figure out the possibility or probability of a threat that the person
00:48:45.580may encounter. And weighing that, weighing the consequences of that threat on how realistic it
00:48:55.760is that it will happen or will not happen. And I think that people can try to figure out
00:49:03.840what their personal threat model is by considering who the bad actors that they may encounter are
00:49:13.060and what their capabilities are and then what they're trying to protect.
00:49:18.500So that may be student protesters that want to keep their anonymity.
00:49:24.600And so maybe they will not bring their phone to a protest
00:49:27.800or maybe they will wear a mask or cover their tattoos
00:49:31.120in order to not be identified physically.
00:49:36.820So that's just like one example of a threat posed to
00:49:43.060uh campus activists and uh this threat modeling process can really be
00:49:50.100used for all aspects of life um you can threat model everything in your daily life i mean just
00:49:58.320to build on that like one thing i want to highlight is we all threat model every day as sam is saying
00:50:03.720like um you can use it in your everyday life and you do like when you decide to cross the street
00:50:08.500not not at the light, you are threat modeling, right? When you're sort of making a decision
00:50:13.540around how you're going to like get home or go to go somewhere, that is like a form of threat
00:50:22.020modeling. And I think I think that there this is I think this is what gets really tied into then
00:50:29.040trying to understand a bit more about surveillance literacy and like security literacy and privacy
00:50:34.520literacy is really important. Threat modeling is incredibly important. It's how you can decide,
00:50:41.380you know, it's how you can maintain some safety. What I think is harder when the challenge is,
00:50:47.380is also helping folks feel safe and secure around threat modeling. And some of that now
00:50:54.300comes down to how do we understand like the tactics and tools of our adversaries? That's
00:51:00.880understanding their why right the why doesn't matter but it's understanding like what are they
00:51:05.280using and so I think for um for folks that are going to actions please go please try to wear
00:51:15.100something um that sort of helps anonymize you so I would not recommend wearing your you know um
00:51:23.800Cal State the year you're graduating shirt, um, or like your really awesome jacket that you made
00:51:33.360that's one of a kind. Um, I would recommend wearing something that's a little bit more
00:51:38.140plain. I would really try to cover your face, cover your tattoos. Um, I would recommend leaving
00:51:46.420your phone at home if you feel comfortable doing that. Um, you know, I think this gets into a
00:51:52.880different space if we're talking about folks that are um either there to observe or document um
00:52:03.480there's a lot of great guides out there on how to document a protest safely um some of that you
00:52:11.860know we point to our friends at open archive and witness who have really great guides written for
00:52:18.560human rights defenders on how to document actions and safely upload them. We recommend following
00:52:23.820that. Please check out different safety guides that have been put out pretty recently from the
00:52:30.820EFF or the markup in terms of how to stay safe at a protest. We're updating and creating a new
00:52:37.680anti-doxing guide, and we're also putting out guides hopefully soon. But a big thing is maybe
00:52:42.840don't bring your phone with you. And if you have an iPhone and you need to bring your phone,
00:52:46.360considering turning it off, putting it in lockdown mode and turning it off.
00:52:50.300Yeah, we'll actually hear from EFF's technologist who wrote that guide next week about some concrete
00:52:55.560tips for digital security at protests. So folks should definitely tune in. But are you all working
00:53:00.380on any guides that folks should know about? One thing is like, you know, if you turn your phone
00:53:05.700on and you've brought with you at the protest and you're like tweeting about where you are
00:53:10.860and you're taking a photo of where you are, that might negate a lot of the safety tips that you've
00:53:17.360already gone through, right? And so one thing to consider is also like, can you put that out later?
00:53:22.600Can you scrub metadata from it? Are you doxing accidentally your fellow protesters? Like are
00:53:29.820they, are their faces covered? You can use Signal's face blurring tool, which they have. You can blur
00:53:35.320out people's faces. That also helps strip the image of metadata. So there's like all these
00:53:42.400different things you can do. And I think it's worth doing those and going to the protest. I
00:53:47.420think some of this is also shifting our own concepts of what it means to sort of document
00:53:52.560and protest safely. And I think some of that is recognizing that like going to the protest
00:53:59.280is almost more important than publishing an image that you were there. I think there's other ways
00:54:06.520to talk about being there. And that's not to discourage people from posting, but rather it's
00:54:12.060to say threat model and really think about what's in this image. You know, what does this image
00:54:17.900reveal, right? What does this image reveal about me? Was it reveal about other people?
00:54:22.820could someone be identified um who is you know who I'm protesting with how could this negatively
00:54:32.060impact them right I think it is thinking about some of those some of those things um as we engage
00:54:38.120in collective action um and so those are like some of the tips I want people to like think about
00:54:45.460which is you know make a plan with your friends later of when you're going to meet up and pick a
00:54:49.340time and make sure you know how to get there and if you don't show up in a certain amount of time
00:54:55.740maybe that's a signal to them that something has happened and like have that conversation and these
00:55:00.960are like really safe ways to still go about and engage in this really necessary I would argue
00:55:08.160like civic action that we need to be engaging in and that's just a really great way to cut down on
00:55:15.260ensuring your your phone isn't you know contributing to um this ongoing surveillance apparatus or
00:55:25.520just turn your phone off and don't turn it on until it's over Caroline Sam thank you so much
00:55:33.120for being here and like truly thank you for your work we need folks like you who are making it
00:55:38.800easier and safer for everybody to use their voices right now so I hope this gives people